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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the rise and 
subsequent decline in power of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. In order to accomplish 
this, a historical examination of Mexico's political and 
economic development will be carried out to provide a 
context for the events leading up to the outcome of the most 
recent Mexican presidential elections in 1988.
i. Introduction
The significance of Mexico as an active participant in the 
international arena, where the activity of sovereign states 
affects the welfare of other states, helps to explain the 
importance of conducting such an examination of its political 
and economic history. In respect to other Latin American 
countries in the region, Mexico occupies a unique position. 
Mexico is a country which borders one of the most influential 
nations in the world, linking it to the rest of Latin America. 
Mexico's geographical location, and subsequent interdependent 
relationship with the United States, causes Mexico to warrant 
special attention. Both the successes and failures of the 
Mexican government affect the rest of the world. The economic 
crisis beginning to engulf Mexico in the 1980s, following a 
series of successful periods of steady economic growth, 
resulted in a growing concern for tin* future of Mexico. 
Particularly the United States, which had already loaned 
millions of dollars in aid to Mexico, was increasingly aware of 
the possibility that Mexico would default on its loans causing 
other Latin American countries to follow suit and default on 
their loans as well. After decades of continuous rule by the PRI, 
Mexico has begun to experience a crisis of political nature, 
resulting in a gradual loss of legitimacy for and trust in the PRI. 
This demonstrates a latent weakness in a one-party system. 
Various sectors of society are denied access to a political 
system for so long that the introduction of a new societal 
element or the persistence of a condition such as economic 
stagnation causes them to become increasingly dissatisfied 
with and resistant to the dominance of a party like the PRI.
The outcome of such political unrest could have serious
repercussions for those countries with a vested interest in
1
preserving the political stability of Mexico, and the stability of 
a region with chronic tendencies towards instability. Of 
special interest, the origins of the Mexican political tradition 
can be traced back to the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Such a 
phenomenon results in a process of national development which 
is distinct from that of those countries which have not 
experienced such a political upheaval. In order to effectively 
examine the history of Mexican development, and speculate on 
the future of Mexican politics, it is necessary to study the 
emergence of the PRI as the major political force in society and 
its ability to maintain a position of national authority 
throughout the decades, until recently.
II. Evolution of the PRI
The Institutional Revolutionary Party initially based its 
strategy for domination of the Mexican state on a set of strong 
party principles. Formed in 1929, Mexico's official party, then 
called the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), was primarily 
concerned with the creation of a strong interventionist state 
which would effectively expand the public sector. In terms of 
the concern with molding a new society, public interests took 
precedence over more traditional private business ventures, 
thus initiating a movement towards the promotion of state 
power. In the pursuit of such consolidation, the ever present 
reality of class struggle was displaced temporarily as public 
officials began to channel their energies towards the 
development of national institutions to unify the country. In the 
economic arena, the development of the industrial sector and 
the protection of emerging industry was soon recognized as yet 
another guiding party principle. State run economic
2
3institutions, including insurance agencies and credit banks, 
were created as a means to promote industry and increase the 
role of the state Agricultural credit became more readily 
available. With the demonstration of such efforts to develop 
the Mexican economy, the PRI assumed that the masses would be 
more inclined to unquestioningly follow the PRI in its plan of 
action. The PRI developed various mechanisms to gain the 
support it needed to ensure its continued legitimacy.
Based on these principles, the PNR evolved into a loose 
coalition of already existing regional interest groups-groups 
that were vying for power at that time. The structure of this 
party was to be flexible enough so as. to promote coexistence 
amongst the various sectors of society.1 Differences of opinion 
would oe resolved through the implementation of broad policy 
emphasizing solidarity and unity within the party. Personal 
differences were to be resolved, in part, through the Queretaro 
Pact of Union and Solidarity of 1929. In signing the document, 
leaders pledged a willingness to accept the policies of the new 
political party without resorting to the use of the armed forces 
to gain power.
Wealthy landowners, representing the dominant economic 
sector, were initially excluded from membership because of 
their opposition to change. The landowner, firmly entrenched in 
Mexican society, constituted a powerful political force in 
regards to the peasants, many of whom depended upon the 
landowners for employment and basic subsistence. The 
emergence of an industrial sector would not begin to 
substantially develop until later. The landowner was still the 
powerful element in Mexican society. During the early 1930s, 
organized labor was excluded, primarily because the demands *
Judith Adler Heilman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and 
Meier Publishers, 1983), pp.35-40.
4took on revolutionary proportions. Because of these rather 
extensive exclusions, the middle class became the PRI's 
dominant social base within the party structure.
In 1937 President Lazaro Cardenas reformed the national 
party and renamed it the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM). 
The new party attempted to integrate four sectors of Mexican 
society including the peasants, labor groups, the military, and 
the popular sector. By including the peasants and the laborers, 
and by giving these groups more opportunities for political 
expression, Cardenas hoped to win their support for land reform 
and nationalization of railroads. The principal idea was to 
provide each sector with the same chance of seeing their 
presidential candidate elected to power. In 1940, when 
Cardenas left office, the individual sectors essentially lost the 
political representation they had enjoyed during his presidential 
term. Equal political representation for each sector had 
somewhat eased the tensions inherent in a society based on a 
rigid class structure. With the decline in such political 
representation, the latent class struggle reemerged as an issue, 
thus overshadowing attempts at the development of national 
unity.
Increasingly visible, corruption began to shape the 
presidential elections. Wide majorities of society were 
completely excluded from any form of political participation. 
The same political candidates were supported each time, 
blatantly emphasizing the poor representation of most of 
society in the elections. A political elite began to surface. The 
peasants never really gained their share of political power, 
which had only begun to evolve during the era of Cardenas, 
because as the party began to consolidate its power it had no 
use for the political support of the peasantry. Representatives 
from each mobilized sector belonging to the party were 
appointed by the state and regional politicians making the
5representatives more loyal to the politicians than to their own 
constituents.- During the actual elections, fraud, especially in 
the form of ballot stuffing, increasingly became a common 
occurrence. The PRI has nullified election results on many a 
technicality or other if an opposition party happens to gain a 
majority in place of the national party. A safeguard against 
such a possibility is the announcement of election results up to 
a full week after actual elections take place. In this way the 
PRI is given a chance to fix results or at least bargain with the 
opposition.
Although the PRI works on the principle that fear of 
repression alone, without resorting to actual repression, will in 
itself make negotiations with the opposition successful, the PRI 
has and will take oppressive measures to retain its political 
dominance. For example, the PRI saw such oppression as 
necessary in the effective elimination of the Church as a 
potential threat to its position of authority. The Cristero 
Revolt of 1929 was forcibly silenced and subsequently the 
supremacy of the state was recognized by the Church.
Over the years the cooptation of the military by the Mexican 
government has been a significant occurrence meant to undermine 
the military's independence, but as the PRI evolved and more fully 
consolidated its power, a desire for civilian supremacy effected 
the eventual exclusion of the military as well. Discussed more in 
depth later, the position of the military in Mexican society has 
remained unique in the Latin American region. Mexico's ability to 
effectively control the military has been facilitated by the 
legitimacy granted the PRI on the basis of its strong tie to the 
revolution. This legitimacy has allowed the PRI to absorb various 
sectors in society without provoking massive political 
disturbances. The middle class, strengthened by the cooptation
2Abdul Nafcy, Dominant Party Politics (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1987), pp. 12-24.
6and eventual exclusion of other sectors in the political processes, 
enhanced its general position as well with its ability to prov 9 
leaders for presidential candidates proficient in the ways of 
manipulation and conciliation. This strength of a growing middle 
class added to the effectiveness of the PRI's practice of cooptation 
and ensured that its plans and goals would be accepted by everyone.
Cooptation became an increasingly effective means by which 
to eliminate growing opposition. Individuals or groups which 
threaten the authority of the PRI arc offered small concessions 
in exchange for a reduction in their demands on the government. 
These concessions include paying off emergent opposition 
leaders, usually the prominent members of organized labor and 
peasant groups, in the form of large sums of money given as 
gifts or by offering influential jobs within the PRI to such 
individuals. Power struggles are internalized in this way. The 
opposition leaders begin to channel their demands through the 
PRI instead of through competing outside parties.3 They become 
absorbed by the system that they were ultimately fighting 
against because the PRI has, until recently, effectively been the 
only channel for upward mobility and political advancement open 
to the Mexican population.
Another way in which the PRI has effectively moved towards 
the further consolidation of its power has been through the 
support and financing of opposition parties. In this way the PRI 
ensures its continued position of authority through the 
fragmentation of opposition votes. The PRI began this practice 
during the 1950's when the party no longer feared that coopted 
opposition leaders might create divisions within the party 
itself, in other words, when cooptation had been consolidated 
satisfactorily. The result was that the supported party in turn 
essentially supported the PRI from the beginning or it simply
3Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, IV85), pp. 
23-35.
7opposed the PRI as a way of bargaining for loans and favors for 
its prominent party members.4 This practice adds to the illusion 
of Mexico as a democratic state, contributes to the legitimacy of 
one-party rule, and centralizes power in the hands of a president 
and his national party. In reality the opposition groups are 
nothing more than pressure groups. In the case that real 
opposition forces surface, the PRI extends public investment to 
the area in which the opposition forces are growing to sustain 
its waning support from the people.
Prevailing conditions within Mexican society enabled the PRI 
to gain popular support and legitimize its sometimes oppressive 
actions. In the 1930's Mexico was feeling the effects of a world 
depression and of a recent national revolution which had 
wreaked havoc on available resources and general living 
conditions. In fact, national institutions had been destroyed 
during the revolution. The unifying force of the revolution had 
been embodied in the form of the PRI. The people needed 
reassurance that the economy would recover and that their 
families were not going tc die of starvation. The PRI guaranteed 
such a recovery with its promises to affect land reform, develop 
the industrial sector, and in general to improve the economy.
The Mexican Revolution had destroyed the old order and a new one 
had not yet been decided upon. The Church no longer held the 
same prestigious position that it once did. This was an 
indication that society would no longer unquestioning follow the 
teachings of the Church. Though this essentially signified a 
greater amount of freedom for the people, it also meant that 
society was no longer allied with a legitimizing power on which 
to rely for ultimate guidance. As years begin to separate the 
present from the era of the revolution, neither are Mexicans 
willing to equate the PRI with the goals of the revolution.
People have increasingly become more disillusioned with the
4lbid. pp. 33*40.
party which promised them such reform from the old political 
system and that seemingly acts solely out of an interest in 
maintain its dominant position in society at the cost of the 
welfare of society. The costs to the general population will 
become more apparent later in this examination. It suffices to 
mention that as poor economic conditions persist, the ability of 
PRI to remedy the situation becomes increasingly doubted by 
Mexican society.
III. Mexican Economic Development
The development of the Mexican economy has been directly 
affected by the evolution of the PRI and its governmental 
policies and has ultimately provided the setting for the emerging 
post-revolutionary power base of the PRI. Even before the 
1900's, export-oriented enclaves in the areas of mining, 
petroleum, and agriculture were developed to meet the rising 
demand for raw materials in Europe and later in the United 
States. A basic domestic banking system was established and 
the beginnings of infrastructure were appearing. Roads, ports, 
railroads, and similar projects developed to support these 
export activities. In this way, progress was achieved for some- 
for those farmers with the largest tracts of land and capital- 
intensive techniques and for some growing industrial sectors- 
but in general only this small minority actually benefited. The 
export of raw materials was related to industrial growth in the 
United States without any corresponding economic development 
in Mexico. The situation in which Mexico found itself was also 
due in part to its Balance of Payments deficit and its growing 
dependence on imports. Importing more than that which was 
exported would lead to inflation as money flowed out of the
8
9economy. In 1925 the Bank of Mexico was created to issue 
currency and monitor monetary transactions. Its principal 
preoccupation would be to create a legitimate financial system 
and to restore public confidence in the system.
In the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution and subsequent 
civil war from 1910*1920, a new ruling elite emerged. The 
traditional elite composed of large landowners, the Church, and 
the military had substantially been replaced by a modern elite 
composed of a capitalist, industry* oriented bourgeoisie. This 
new elite was concerned with economic progress and social 
advancement. By the end of the 1920's President Calles had 
emerged with a strong regime and his dominant political party, 
which would come to be recognized as the PRI.J
The Mexican Revolution had a most devastating effect on the 
country's economy. Between land seizures and abandonment of 
land by owners, the agricultural base was destroyed, and no new 
investment was forthcoming. The commercial banks failed as 
well. In the absence of a central bank in Mexico, money had 
previously been distributed by the commercial banks. The 
circulation of paper currency increased as rival factions issued 
their own currencies. This increased the level of inflation as 
well. All monetary discipline evaporated and there was a total 
loss of confidence in Mexico's financial system. Money was 
traded for real goods and even converted into foreign exchange.
From 1910*1930 there was generally little economic progress 
due to continuous conflict and political instability. In 1934 
Lazaro Cardenas assumed the role of President, and despite his 
ambitious plans for economic and social development, he had 
inherited a difficult situation at best. A fall in the demand for 
Mexican exports-primarily agricultural commodities, minerals, 
and some basic manufactured goods-accompanied the Stock
^Heilman, p.33-35.
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Market crash of 1929 and the ensuing world depression. Domestic 
investment was slow to develop following the Revolution and the 
upheaval of the Mexican financial system. At the same time 
foreign support was low resulting from a general mistrust of 
Mexico in light of its previous instability and upheaval, its 
default on external debts, and certain unorthodox practices of 
Cardenas-namely the petroleum expropriation.6
Cardenas was concerned with extending modernization beyond 
the small export enclaves and promoting greater equality of 
income and opportunity. Cardenas undertook sizable 
infrastructure projects in agriculture, irrigation systems, and 
dams in order to unify the country into a single market, raise 
levels of output and to broaden the base of future economic 
growth. In addition to promoting land redistribution programs, 
the government fostered development of trade unions as well.
Officials in Mexico saw little choice but to resort to 
inflationary means to finance development. A lack of private 
investment initiative caused the government to take a direct and 
powerful role in Mexico's economic development. The 
government quickly accelerated expenditures and created 
development banks to channel credit to targeted sectors like 
agriculture and public works who were unable to receive credit 
on commercial terms. Subsequently there was a large increase 
in available credit from both private and official banks. Little 
control over the expansion of credit by private banks resulted in 
an expanded money supply. Inflation was thus on the rise.
However, inflation was kept in check despite heavy government 
spending, which generally leads to greater inflation, by a 
favorable balance of trade. In 1939 revenues of 216 million 
dollars were generated from exports whereas only 180 million
6Kenneth Johnson, Mexican Democracy A Critical View (Colorado: 
Wcstvicw Press, 1985), pp. 53-60.
was spent on imports.7 As the demand for items such as cement 
and steel rose, domestic industry increased its productivity. In 
this way, the modern industrial growth of Mexico originated in 
government spending of the 1930's.
The agricultural policies of Cardenas included the distribution 
of lands used for cultivating subsistence crops, namely corn and 
beans, in densely populated rural areas to former landless 
laborers so that they could minimally support a family. At the 
same time the government opened up new areas with irrigation 
systems, for use by targe capital owning landowners in large- 
scale mechanized agriculture producing cash crops for export.
One of the most distinguishing features of the Cdrdenas 
administration was his agrarian reform program. To redistribute 
land, and to disrupt the traditional land tenure pattern of large 
plots of land owned by the wealthy few, ejidos were developed. 
These small landholding communities were created from land 
expropriated from former haciendas, large estates, and provided 
the landless laborers and tenants who actually cultivated the land 
with the opportunity to own their own land and have limited 
access to credit in order to sustain it. With the codification of 
the agrarian reform laws in 1934, the campesinos were more 
effectively integrated politically and economically within the 
state.8 Ejidatarios, those who had newly acquired the plots of 
land, would hold their property for life and were able to bequeath 
it at death. The land could not be mortgaged or sold and had to be 
cultivated by the recipient. A later law of 1971 permitted the 
landowners to enter into limited commercial contracts where 
they could rent their land. This system of ejidos declined after
7John K. Thompson. Inflation. Financial Markets and Economic 
Development (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1981), pp. 32-35.
8Jamcs Cockcroft, Dependency and Underdevelopment (Garden City: 
Doublcday/Anchor, 1972), pp. 42-53.
Cardenas even though successors would essentially agree with it 
in theory.
After 1940 industrial policy concentrated on the technique of 
import-substitution. Previously Mexico had operated under an 
export-led economy under which the country concentrated on the 
export of a few raw materials to the developed countries. During 
World War II there was a rising demand in the United States for 
primary and basic manufactured goods. At the same time the 
United States enforced quotas on its exports in an effort to 
reserve its resources for the war cause. This meant that Mexico 
could no longer import as much as its reserve holdings would 
allow. Partly to make up for this discrepancy between demand 
and volume of imports, and partly to curb growing dependence on 
the outside world, Mexico began implementing the beginnings of 
what would come to be known as the process of import- 
substitution industrialization. Under this program the 
government encouraged the growth of manufacturing firms 
producing goods that had previously been imported from abroad. 
High tariffs and import licensing give these firms a competitive 
edge over foreign producers and they limited internal 
competition as well. By the late 1960's some efforts to shift 
over to a more export-oriented policy could be seen, however.
Table 1
Employment in Agricultural. Industrial and Service Sectors
(% of total)
1940 1970 i a z a
Industry 15% 22% 28%
mining and
petroleum 2% 1% 1%
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manufactures 11% 17% 20%
Services 19% 32% 43%
Agriculture 65% 39% 29%
source: Kurian, George Thomas. "Mexico." Encyclopedia of fre
Third World.1987 ed.
As can be seen in Table 1. agricultural production represented 
16% of the GDP in 1960 and less than 10% by 1979. A steady 
increase in population meant that there were more agricultural 
workers than land to be distributed. As time went on. agrarian 
policies were slanted to favor large landowners who were utilizing 
more advanced technology in production methods. Industry 
accounted for 25% of the GDP in 1960 and for 30.2% in 1979. By 
1979 the agricultural sector was employing less than half of the 
number of workers it had employed in 1940.
The government utilized tax policies to promote import- 
substitution. The manufacturing sectors received tax benefits 
and preferred treatment in respect to capital imports. In 1955 
the Law of the Promotion of New and Necessary Industries 
protected the manufacturing of products not previously produced 
domestically or those products considered necessary for survival 
as long as they did not compete with products already being 
produced domestically. The purpose of this was to create the 
formation of a capital goods sector and to eventually reduce the 
country's dependence on imports.
Government monetary policies also helped to support import- 
substitution by providing the available credit for manufacturers 
Meanwhile, government support for other sectors decreased and 
what support they did receive was beneficial to only a small 
group such as large wealthy landowners in the agricultural
14
sector. Industry became increasingly more capital-intensive and 
increasingly less able to absorb labor. In 1932 the peso was 
devaluated with respect to the U.S. dollar. The peso stabilized 
until 1938 when the Bank of Mexico let the exchange rate 
devaluate again. At the end of the 1930's there was yet another 
devaluation with respect to the U.S. dollar. In pursuing 
government development policies using inflationary means, there 
was a certain price to pay.
Table 2
Commodity Composition of Exoorls (1940-1965)
1940-49 1951-55 1961-65
Minerals 61.9% 33.3% 21.3%
Agricultural
products 31.3% 53.3% 43.2%
Manufactures . . . . 8.1% 21.8%
source: Kurian
Over the years Mexico increasingly had to import more food so 
that by 1980 it would be importing 80% of its total grain intake. 
Such a situation led to an increasing Balance of Payments deficit. 
In 1942, in response to its Balance of Payments problem and to its 
relatively stable economic position, Mexico began negotiating its 
foreign debts which had been in default for more than twenty 
years. The government created a fixed schedule of payments and 
compensated the United States and Great Britain for oil and
15
railroads expropriated in 1938.9 It appeared as if Mexico's 
financial situation was improving and that it would once again be 
able to borrow in international markets now that it was beginning 
to gain worldwide trust with its stabilization of the government 
and of the economy.
By the end of World War II Mexico was fairly advanced in its 
import-substitution program, though inflation finance was looked 
at unfavorably by the rest of the world, especially when most 
countries had been trying to keep inflation down. However,
Mexico had mobilized domestic resources and the economy was 
experiencing a high rate of growth. More of an emphasis was 
placed on economic growth than on an egalitarian redistribution 
of income as continued economic growth was seen as an 
equivalent for modernization. The economy was characterized by 
government spending on infrastructure projects financed by the 
expansion of bank credit. This expansion was a policy designed to 
benefit the industrial sector which would reinvest profits gained 
from an increase in industrial activity back into industry. 
President Miguel Aleman, who replaced President Camacho in 
1946, continued the general policies of his predecessors. He gave 
lower priority to social reform projects in favor of industrial 
projects and inflationary means of financing economic 
development. He fostered growth of domestic industry and 
capital formation.
In the agrarian sector, large wealthy landowners were given 
favored treatment. Private farmers were offered state subsidies 
to improve their technology-this would result in a decreasing 
need for wage laborers. Agriculture was able to provide export 
revenue though it accounted for an increasingly smaller portion 
of exports.
Since domestic investment, backed by official policy, 
continued to expand well in excess of voluntary domestic savings
9Hcllman, p. 60-64.
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and foreign capital, economic expansion was financed by printing 
money. Monetary policy continued to supply credit for public 
spending and industrial expansion with little regard for stability. 
The money supply expanded rapidly at a rate of growth three 
times that of the rate of growth of real output, thus creating 
inflationary pressures.
The official policy of promoting forced savings through 
inflation implies the transfer of real income from those 
consuming to those investing. Contrary to the situation in 
Mexico, budget deficits in some of the countries in the rest of 
Latin America reflected additional government expenditures in 
the consumptive sector in an attempt to help low-income 
workers. Mexico was not funding the consumptive sector. 
Cooptation of labor in Mexico helped to eliminate any organized 
opposition to government policies. The real strength of the 
Mexican government was shown by its ability to maintain itself 
in office despite a continued fall in real wage levels.
Despite the government's strength, by 1950 Mexico had started 
to change its pattern of inflationary economic development to one 
of more stabilizing development. In 1954 once more the peso was 
devaluated, and despite the success of inflation finance in 
contributing to a high rate of economic growth, Mexico switched 
from an inflationary finance system with periodic devaluations of 
the peso to a dependence on domestic price stability and a stable 
exchange rate.10 Inflation was eroding real wages which 
ultimately caused the price of food to increase. This situation 
was socially intolerable and politically dangerous so the new 
administration therefore was forced to change its policies.
President Flores would be the one to implement the new 
program of stability. 1954 marked the beginning of the 
transitional period and by 1958 the program was already under 
way. In 1958 President Adolfo Lopez Mateos started his
10Hcllman, p. 82-96.
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'Stabilizing Development' program which would continue with 
stable prices and exchange rates. High rates of growth continued 
under this new program, and so did expansion of import- 
substitution industrialization. Increasing inflows of foreign 
capital and increased voluntary domestic savings channeled 
through the market in fixed-interest securities became the new 
sources with which to finance domestic investment. The rate of 
growth was the same during the inflationary period as it was 
during the stable period. Growth was the result of a rapid 
increase in productivity which resulted from an increase in 
investment. The public sector generated growth as well as 
providing a stimulus to growth in other sectors, as infrastructure 
outlays unified the country into a single market.
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and the Echeverria administration continued 
the 'Stability Development' program throughout the 1960s. By the 
1970s severe economic problems had begun to surface. The high 
rate of economic growth, spurred by the utilization of advanced 
technology imported from abroad, led to growing unemployment 
and underemployment. The economy began to show the effects of 
inflationary finance again. Public expenditure continued to rise 
and so did the rate of inflation. A continued increase in imports 
resulted in the persistence of a Balance of Payments deficit which 
in itself contributed to the problem of inflation. In 1974 exports 
dropped due to a slowdown in the international economy, though 
oil exports would continue to increase until the early 1980s. In 
hopes of preventing an all-out Balance of Payments crisis, the 
government decided to pursue an anti-inflationary policy. Public 
expenditure decreased and inflation fell—at the expense of an 
already impoverished nation. In 1976 the peso was devaluated 
again with respect to the U.S. dollar. The stage was set for the 
'Crisis of the Eighties'.
IV. The Crisis of the Eighties
A variety of adverse conditions present in Mexico helped 
precipitate the crisis of 1982. One of the chronic long-term 
problems included the six year cycle of the presidential term 
still in effect today. At the end of each term a substantial 
increase in government expenditure usually takes place as the 
president attempts to quickly implement all previously promised 
programs not yet put into effect. The successor then spends his 
first year in office trying to stabilize the economy after such a 
disruptive action." Another long-term problem contributing to 
the crisis was the great inequality between different sectors of 
Mexican society, a problem which persists today. A small elite 
accounts for most of the country's wealth while the majority of 
the common people are unable to buy sufficient amounts of food 
to feed their families. With the onset of the 1980s 10% of the 
national income was received oy the bottom 40% of the 
population. In contrast 54% of the national income was received 
by the top 20% of the population. By 1982 Mexicans were lacking 
confidence in the PRI and doubting its ability to pull the country 
out of the crisis. Lastly, an immediate short-term cause was 
Mexico's growing dependence on oil to spur the economy when 
global oil prices plummeted to the lowest level yet.
The continuing problems resulting from the implementation of 
the process of import-substitution worsened the general 
conditions of Mexican society as well. As the development of the 
industrial sector became of foremost importance in the Mexican 
pian for modernization, the traditional agricultural sector began to 
lose its position of economic prominence in Mexico. Rural peasants 
migrated en masse towards the urban areas to seek employment. *1
"Je rry  R. Ladman, Mexico: A Country in Crisis (Texas: Texas Western 
Press, (1983), pp. 31-36.
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Unfortunately for a country like Mexico with a large supply of 
cheap labor, the new industries were typically of a capital- 
intensive nature as indicated earlier. In such a situation 
unemployment was high and continuously increasing. These new 
industries, depending primarily on capital imports from abroad, 
increased the total inflow of imports to Mexico and consequently, 
the Balance of Payments deficit likewise increased. Foreign 
investment, which helped supply Mexico with necessary capital and 
technology likewise contributed to the development of a capital- 
intensive industry, adding to the problem of scarce employment and 
import dependence without a similar increase in exports.
Subtle indications that a crisis might be imminent surfaced 
during the 1970's. Luis Echeverria Alvarez, president from 1970- 
1976, had tried to diversify the Mexican economy while lessening 
Mexico's dependence on the United States. To this end, he relied on 
a strong role for the public sector. Government deficits, as a 
result of heavy government spending, were increasingly financed by 
inflationary monetary policies and increased foreign borrowing.
The foreign debt had skyrocketed by the end of Echeverria's term. 
The progressive nature of Echeverria's policies had alienated PRI's 
right-wing support. Even the left became increasingly 
disillusioned as economic conditions worsened and the one-party 
system, maintaining the PRI in power since 1929, seemed 
powerless to help the situation and improve the Mexican quality of 
life .
Preceding the inauguration of President Jose Lopez Portillo in 
1976, large quantities of petroleum had been discovered in 
southeastern Mexico, primarily in the states of Tabasco and 
Chiapas, and as a result of offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The amounts of oil available to Mexico varied over the years but in 
1960 President Portillo verified that Mexico had nearly sixty 
billion barrels with probable reserves at two hundred billion. For 
comparison, two hundred billion barrels is larger than the supply
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of oil available to Saudi Arabia and almost equal to the reserves 
of the entire Persian Gulf.1- By 1981, Mexico would be the fourth 
largest oil producer in the world. Mexico increased its daily oil 
production steadily but not rapidly .though it did have the capital 
and technology resources necessary to do so. It resisted foreign 
pressures to expand more quickly because of the potential 
consequences of an extensive foreign capital intake, primarily an 
overdependence on the United States. Earnings from oil 
production increased from 123 million dollars in 1974 to 10.413 
million by 1980.11 At this point, it seemed as though oil prices 
would continue to increase. Mexico was gaining international 
prestige in a world orienting itself around those who were 
capable of producing oil and those who were not.
It was Mexico's intent to utilize its new source of energy, in 
addition to its large supply of human resources, as a way to solve 
the social and economic inequalities present in Mexican society.
By 1980 there existed an extreme dependence of the export sector 
on oil revenues. By 1979 oil accounted for 42.8% of total Mexican 
exports. Natural product exportation consequently decreased 
dramatically accounting for less than 25% of total exports. The 
oil industry had a negative effect on the balance of trade in itself 
as imports rose. Mexico required oil-drilling equipment and 
technology. In 1979 Mexico imported $233 million worth of oil­
field machinery from the United States. In all, Mexico was 
exporting an amount of manufactured machinery goods equivalent 
to 4.2% of its total exports while it imported an amount 
equivalent to 33% of its total imports.
President Portillo promoted and utilized Mexico's favorable oil- 
based economic position as a means to gaining the confidence of
1 ^Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course of Mexican 
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p,i. 41-53.
'^Jcsus-Augustin Vclasco-S., Impacts of Mexican Oil Policy on Economic 
and Political Development (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983), pp.113- 1ft.
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domestic and foreign capitalists who had been skeptical of 
Mexico's credit worthiness. He was dedicated to using petroleum 
wealth to generate the autonomous development of Mexico.
Despite a determination not to, Mexico became dangerously 
dependent on oil revenues. By 1981 oil would account for three- 
fourths of Mexico's total export earnings and one-third of 
government revenues.14
The capital-intensive nature of petroleum and petrochemical 
production meant that thousands of dollars worth of capital had to 
be invested to create only a few new jobs. Mexico's most abundant 
resource, labor, could not be utilized efficiently. Jobs would have 
to be created in other areas. By the late 1970's Portillo was 
faced with an unemployment rate of almost half of the Mexican 
labor force due to the generally capital-intensive nature of 
industry in Mexico combined with an unavailability of jobs in a 
diminishing agricultural sector.
Various other negative effects of dependence on oil production 
became apparent. Not able to produce oil in Mexico without foreign 
technology meant that Mexico had to rely on extensive U.S. 
financial support to buy the supplies necessary to initiate such a 
project and industrial projects in general. This situation harmed 
Mexico's chances of becoming less dependent on the outside world. 
However, reliance on oil production for revenue was almost 
inevitable due to the fact that all other sectors of the economy 
were failing. The process of drilling for oil tended to lure laborers 
away from land and water related work. In addition, large fertile 
tracts of land were destroyed and water was contaminated in the 
search for oil.
Agricultural production which had stagnated due to the 
growing emphasis on industrial development could not keep up 
with the population explosion that Mexico had been experiencing 
since the 1930's. As more national resources were gradually
I 4 Vclasco-S„ pp. 113-15.
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devoted to industrial endeavors, food that Mexico had been 
producing locally was imported. Fearing that all revenues from 
petroleum production would be spent on food, the government 
formed the Sistema Alimenticio Mexicano (SAM), the Mexican Food 
System. This was to become the first major effort to increase 
agricultural production in postwar Mexico. The goal of the 
program was to achieve an annual agricultural growth of 4% and 
self-sufficiency in basic grains by 1985. Soon after this, the 
World Bank approved a 325 million dollar loan to help Mexico 
implement its program, making it the largest World Bank grant 
ever. SAM promised to improve the living conditions in the rural 
areas. It would eliminate the necessity for large food imports 
while lessening Mexico's unfavorable balance of trade. Several 
years after President Portillo had left however, Mexico was still 
importing about 10 million tons of food annually.15
As could have been expected, Portillo's government drastically 
increased spending near the end of his term. The government 
poured money into construction, public works, social welfare 
projects, and government subsidies of consumer goods. These 
actions increased the government's participation in the economy. 
Although national income alone was insufficient to fund all these 
various programs, vast petroleum reserves in Mexico made the 
international banking community more than willing to extend loans. 
Of course, the government assumed that a worldwide continued 
increase in the price of oil would allow Mexico to generate new 
wealth and repay its debts. Contrary to this assumption, there was 
a world oil glut in the early 1980's and oil prices plummeted. 
Because of its unhealthy dependence on oil production, Mexico was 
devastated.
By the end of 1982 the peso had declined by 76%. Economic 
growth had slowed to zero, down from an average of 8% in the 
previous decade. It threatened to become negative as
15 Meyer, pp. 30-41.
23
manufacturers were increasingly unable to purchase foreign 
inputs on account of the periodic peso devaluations which made 
imports more expensive. As import-substitution forced Mexico to 
become increasingly more dependent on imports, plants shut down 
and laid off their workers because it was no longer possible to 
generate a profit and offset import expenditures. The rate of 
inflation had been 17% in 1978 and by 1982 was close to 100%.1(1 
Mexican businessmen lost confidence in the economy and began 
investing abroad and opening foreign bank accounts enabling them 
to convert pesos to dollars, allowing for significant capital 
flight. The government ordered the Central Bank to stop buying 
and selling dollars and to allow the peso to find its true worth. It 
quickly lost value, allowing Americans to use Mexican services 
like the metro for ridiculously low prices. The peso was at its 
lowest ever and panic ensued in the business sector. President 
Portillo blamed the banks for the massive capital flight and 
accused them of looting and demonstrating greedy behavior.
In September of 1982, President Portillo nationalized a 
portion of the country's banks without consulting with his 
cabinet. This resulted in a significant structural change in the 
economic system of Mexico. It placed Mexican financial 
institutions under the control of the ordinary Mexican 
businessman who then had the power to reshape the economy by 
disposing of inefficient institutions and gain control over private 
capital. The president utilized the restructuring as a way to 
inspire a feeling of nationalism in Mexican society relating it to 
the era of Cardenas and his land reform project.* 17
The State was assuming the role of the nation's banker. Private 
banks' interests in other companies were also expropriated. As a
lftLadman. pp. 23-37.
17Waync E. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter II. Smith, M exico's 
Alternative Political Futures (California: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. 
1989), pp. 32-50.
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result, the federal government acquired minority or majority 
interests in more than one hundred private f;:'ris. This accounted 
for 60-80% of Mexico's GDP. At the same time, the Bank of Mexico 
went from being a mixed bank, of public and private interests, to a 
decentralized agency of the federal government.
In President Portillo's justification of the nationalization of the 
banks, he included his intention to prevent capital flight which 
would imply that the government did not have enough control 
over the banks previously to prevent such capital flight. He also 
indicated that the government could not establish an exchange-rate 
policy adequately protecting Mexican industry without this 
control. It was the government itself, however, that had 
established the policy of free convertibility of the peso. In 
addition no individual bank was making a market for itself in 
foreign exchange alone.
The International Monetary Fund had been helping Mexico to 
finance its debts at the end of the 1970's until the price of oil 
increased so much so that the Mexican economy began to stabilize 
on its own. In the midst of the crisis, the IMF promised help to 
Mexico if it would straighten itself out economically. When Mexico 
ran out of dollars to pay off its foreign debts, the United States 
realized that the consequences of a Mexican default on its external 
debts would have a negative effect on everyone possibly initiating 
a total regional default on loans. The United States, the IMF. and 
a group of commercial banks, rushed a rescue loan package to 
Mexico. The program allowed for Mexico to continue paying 
interest, but did not allow for amortization. Mexico had to adopt 
the austerity plan proposed by the IMF. This plan indicated that 
Mexico would have to reduce the public deficit which was 15% of 
the GDP.1 * This would mean phasing out government subsidies of 
food and public utilities. The Mexican government began reducing 
tariff barriers to stimulate greater industrial efficiency and
ltlLadman, pp. 46-57.
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ensure greater competitiveness in world export markets. In 
reality, liberalization of the Mexican economy would not ultimately 
allow Mexico to compete internationally on account of the 
comparative advantage in production already enjoyed by the 
developed countries. Mexico was led into a deep recession and 
living standards decreased even more drastically. The Mexican 
population would only endure these conditions for so long before 
they would expect to see positive reinforcement.
Miguel de la Madrid inherited all of these problems when he 
took office in 1982. Mexico's foreign debt had escalated into a 
large-scale problem by this time. Mexico could not pay its debts 
and reactivate the economy simultaneously. By 1984 the peso had 
begun to slip against the dollar and plunged on the free market. In 
1985 the exchange was 380 pesos to the U.S. dollar, and by 1986 
it was 800 to 1. Petroleum prices continued in their downward 
trend with the 1985 rupture of the OPEC cartel over controlling 
quotas of oil exports. The President began arranging a 
rescheduling of payment on the national debt.
Table 3
Mexican Debt 1981-1986 fin billions of dollars)
1 M 2 is m I M S
Total 91 95 102
% of GDP 53 54 79
Interest 1 2 12 8
source: The Statesman's Yearbook
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Political parties, peasant groups, and various other interest 
groups urged de la Madrid to declare a unilateral moratorium on the 
payments. A similar action in 1861 had resulted in foreign 
intervention and the establishment of a French empire in Mexico. 
Intervention was not likely this time, and interest rates certainly 
were excessive, but Mexico needed to win the confidence of the 
world banking community. To this end, Madrid opted for more 
economic austerity. Government expenditures were reduced again, 
projects were curtailed, federal subsidies were reduced, and de 
la Madrid even cut federal jobs and salaries. Here, Mexico received 
some praise for making progress towards stabilization.
De la Madrid also lessened the severity of some of the 
restrictions imposed by Portillo with the nationalization of the 
banking system. He believed that the government needed foreign 
exchange to stimulate the economy, so he relaxed some of the 
previous exchange policies while at the same time developing a 
comprehensive system of exchange controls. He provided for the 
eventual sale of 34% of the stock of the newly nationalized banks 
to the private sector.
On September 19, 1985, the Mexican economy suffered another 
hardship when an earthquake devastated the capital. Damage was 
estimated at more than 4 billion dollars.19 Mexico made efforts 
to repair the damage but it was impossible to make regular 
payments on the foreign debt. International banks rescheduled the 
payments again.
In 1986 the IMF instigated the Baker Plan in Mexico with the 
support of the World Bank and commercial banks. For the first 
time, an IMF program would be growth-oriented as well as 
stabilizing. The project included the cutting back of government 
subsidies and the disposal of state enterprises. Mexico was
19Mcycr, pp. 28-36.
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obligated to pursue even more liberal trade strategies and to use 
more realistic exchange and interest rates to prevent capital 
flight while decreasing tariffs on imports.
Mexico began making plans to liberalize its trade strategies 
to an even greater extent by joining GATT whose principal goal 
it is to promote trade liberalization. In theory this would cause 
Mexico to become rrnre competitive in the export sector and 
local industry would be forced to greater efficiency by foreign 
competition. Each member country assumes the long-term 
responsibility of reduce trade barriers on imports with no special 
conditionality available for individual countries. Developed and 
developing countries alike have the same type of access to the 
international market. In this situation developing countries and 
their inefficient industries are unable to compete with foreign 
firms.
The overall economic crisis has spread into political life as 
well. As previous political corruption, including the illegally 
expropriated land and revenues from oil exports during the 
Echeverria administration, became public knowledge, the people 
became more disillusioned with the government. Real wages 
were decreasing and the capacity of the government to satisfy 
material demands was doubted. In addition a sizable narcotics 
ring was developing in Mexico. These factors, plus continuing 
electoral fraud by the PRI, caused the party's support to weaken 
even more. In 1983 the PRI had been embarrassed by losses in 
mayoral elections in the northern states, where elections had 
supposedly been handled more liberally. Realizing that it was 
losing its previous support, the PRI was concerned that the right- 
wing National Action Party (PAN) might start gaining power. To 
prevent this from happening, the PRI invested large sums of 
money on lavish developmental projects, while reportedly 
stuffing ballot boxes during the midterm elections of July 7. 
1985 for various governors, all federal deputies, and mayors.
PAN charged the PRI with extensive corruption, and when the 
same kinds of practices took place during the elections for 
regional governors on July 6, 1986, the image of the PRI was 
tarnished even more. At the same time, the government was 
faced with its highest foreign debt ever, at greater than $100 
billion, and its highest rate of unemployment.
At the close of the 1980s the political economy of Mexico is 
still feeling pressures due to continuing societal problems. 
Mexico's foreign debt burden increases annually. By the end of 
1987 the total debt was estimated at more than $105 billion, 
more than 75% of the GDP. In addition Mexico has been suffering 
since the late 1970s from massive capital flight in the midst of 
the instabilities of the Mexican economy. Total public sector 
deficits are reaching tens of billions of dollars. In 1987 the 
interest on this deficit was 15.2% of the GDP. while the total 
interest was close to 20%. This accounts for approximately 3/4 
of all public expenditure in Mexico. The country suffers from 
bouts of inflation, due also in part to periods of world inflation. 
Without technological or economic infrastructure for 
satisfactory growth and development, Mexico is even more 
susceptible to inflationary trends. The government must come up 
with a way to stimulate employment as the labor force rapidly 
expands while attempting to adjust the maldistribution of income 
which affects the very poor most drastically. Along similar lines 
Mexico faces somewhat of a food security problem as staple 
foods that used to be produced domestically are now primarily 
imported due in part to the overall neglect of the agricultural 
sector.
V. U.S.-Mexican Economic Relations
The United States has played a substantial role in the shaping 
of general economic development in Mexico. The economic 
relationship between Mexico and the United States can best be
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described as one of asymmetrical interdependence. Both countries 
rely on each other to a certain extent but Mexico clearly is the 
more dependent of the two. Four principal factors in particular 
illustrate this dependence. These include trade, tourism and 
migration, direct investment, and external debt. Various other 
elements having perhaps a less profound effect on Mexico's 
dependence on the United States, though influential just the same, 
help to explain the interdependent relationship as well.
One of the most obvious indicators of this asymmetrical 
interdependence involves the terms of trade in the exchange of 
goods between Mexico and the United States. It is useful to start 
with the basic economic characteristics of each country in making 
a full analysis. The United States is generally classified as a 
powerful, rich developed country which covers an area of more 
than eight million square kilometers. It is a country with access 
to an abundance of natural resources and which supports a 
population greater than 200 million. The U S. GNP exceeds one 
trillion dollars while the average per capita income is 
approximately $8,000.20 Conversely, Mexico is often considered to 
be a middle power, a developing nation, which covers 
approximately 2 million square kilometers. Mexico has a variety 
of natural resources at its disposal, but only a limited quantity of 
each. Severe social inequalities, coupled with an annual 
population increase, contributes to Mexico's instability.
The United States is Mexico's largest trading partner. During 
the 1970's, the United States accounted for 60% of Mexico's 
exports and supplied 62% of its imports. Figures from 1987 
indicate that the United States accounted for 77% of Mexico's non­
oil exports. Japan, Mexico's second leading trade partner, 
accounts for only less than 5% of Mexico's total trade including
2°Peggy B. Musgrave, Mexico and the United Staias (Colorado: Westview Press. 
1985), pp. 25-30.
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both imports and exports.-1 While the United States counts on 
continued trade with Mexico as well. Mexico is only our third 
largest trading partner lagging way behind Canada and Japan, and 
represents a significantly lower percentage of our total trade as 
compared to Canada or Japan. Already it should be clear that the 
United States is much less trade dependent than our neighbor to 
the south.
It is also important, in addition to measuring the volume of 
trade between the two countries, to look at what is traded.
Mexico typically exports non-essential goods to the United States, 
including fruits, like strawberries, and vegetables. These 
products characteristically suffer from fluctuations in demand 
and price. They are fairly easily substituted with other goods 
since they are not necessary for basic subsistence. Mexico 
imports capital goods and essential agricultural products like 
grains from the United States. These products must flow steadily 
into Mexico for the survival of the people and the stability of the 
economy. The Mexican people must eat. The nature of these 
imports makes Mexico much more dependent on the United States 
whereas the United States has more freedom to buy non-essential 
goods, similar to those which are produced in Mexico, from a 
variety of world markets.
In the past, Mexico has attempted to diversify its patterns of 
trade by opening itself up to negotiations with a variety of other 
countries. This was made difficult in the 1970's due to a strong 
link between the peso and the appreciating dollar. Even though 
the buying power of the dollar has decreased over the years,
Mexico continues to depend on the United States. In an attempt 
to correct its own trade imbalance, the United States has begun 
to increase its implementation of protectionist polices as a way 
of defending its own domestic industry. A U.S. recession or an
SlRiordan Roett, ed., Mexico and the United States (Colorado: Westview Press. 
1988), pp. 34 -45 .
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increase in protectionist policies could severely limit a Mexican 
export-led strategy.
Throughout the 1980s, under de la Madrid Mexico has 
concentrated on a plan to liberalize trade. After joining GATT in 
1986, Mexico was pressured to lower previous tariff levels and 
soften restrictions on the quantity of imports allowed from the 
United States. Theoretically, after liberalizing trade policies. 
Mexican firms will become more competitive with firms 
worldwide. Consequently Mexico could eventually become a more 
active participant m the global economy. In fact, what usually 
occurs is quite the opposite. Mexican firms cannot effectively 
compete in areas where other firms have the comparative 
advantage in production. Mexican firms have a difficult time 
compet ng many times because they are generally inefficiently 
operated. Ultimately these Mexican corporations are forced to 
shut down because they cannot not make a profit. Mexicans are 
also concerned that such liberal trade policies will cause Mexico 
to become a colony of the United States, indicating that the 
United States would dump all of its excess exports into the 
Mexican economy thus disrupting the balance of trade. On the 
other side, the United States is concerned that Mexico may 
interfere with its other trading interests in Mexico's pursuit to 
expand its export markets to increasingly include greater regions 
of the world. Because of such persisting doubts. Mexico and the 
Unitea States must work on improving their relationship. A 
recent 'framework agreement' promotes discussion between the 
two countries on various trade strategies.
Tourism and migration between Mexico and the United States 
provide another example of a dependent relationship. The United 
States accounts for 87% of Mexico's total tourism.-2 Mexico, on 
the other hand, accounts for a much smaller percentage of the 
total tourism in the United States. Consequently, more money is
22Mus(jrave, pp. 43-51.
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spent by Americans in Mexico than by Mexicans vacationing in the 
United States. Mexico is provided with a source of income and 
foreign exchange to offset the Balance of Payments deficit.
Recent measures taken by the United States to limit the amount 
of dollars flowing out of the country have hurt the Mexican 
tourist trade somewhat. The United States has cut almost in half 
the amount of duty free goods allowed in from Mexico. In 
addition, business conferences held outside of the United States, 
for the most part, are no longer tax-deductible. In the past when 
the Mexican peso has been overvalued. Mexicans tended to travel 
more frequently because they could buy American goods at a 
lower price. During these periods there was a substantial drain 
on Mexico's Balance of Payments.
The migration of Mexicans to the United States in search of 
employment indicates an increase in unemployment and 
"nderemployment in Mexico and a dependence on the United States 
tu supply jobs. The extensive border between the two countries 
facilitates the migration. Various estimates show that 
somewhere between two and eight million Mexicans migrate north 
each year. Some of these are seasonal workers and others 
relocate permanently. In Mexico the rate of unemployment- 
underemployment is perhaps close to 40%.21 The supply of 
available jobs cannot keep pace with the increasing population, 
and in addition the hourly wage is much higher in the United 
States.
It is argued by some that the migrant workers take jobs away 
from the unskilled Americans thus forcing them to live on welfare 
or unemployment. There is also a concern that the migrant 
workers depress the wage scales and that they are detrimental to 
the U.S. Balance of Payment with the remittance of millions of
^Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations. The 
Challenge of Interdependence: Mexico and the United States (New York: University 
Press of America. 1989), p. 89.
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dollars. Lastly, the workers are accused of consuming more in 
welfare and educational services than they pay in taxes. Contrary 
to these beliefs, it seems that migrant workers may in fact 
contribute more to the American economy than they take away 
They willingly take the lowest paying agricultural work that 
Americans will not take, while the same Americans rely instead 
on welfare. The workers allow industries to thrive that might 
otherwise not be able to sustain wage increases for their workers. 
Generally, illegal immigrants are law-abiding because they do not 
want to risk being caught and deported back to Mexico if they are 
found.
Direct investment in Mexico by the United States is another 
factor which leads to greater dependency of the latter on the first. 
U S. investment in Mexico was minimal throughout the 1800's, but 
by 1911 the United States had invested $646 million. Of this 
investment 41% was invested in railways, 36% in mining, and a 
substantial proportion in oil after 1910. From 1920 until the 
1940's U.S. investment had decreased to $300 million. Foreign 
investment in general played a small role in the economy. By 1944 
the trend had reversed itself and American investment was on an 
increase, representing an amount equal to 56% of total investment 
in Mexico. This figure does not include that percentage of 
domestic investment involving a high level of foreign participation 
and influence.24 Foreign credit though was instead becoming a 
more important manner for the channelling of foreign currencies to 
Mexico. Presently the United States accounts for approximately 
80% of total direct foreign investment in Mexico. Of this, 75% is 
invested in the manufacturing sector, a figure representing one 
fourth of total investment in manufacturing. The total amount 
invested by the United States is greater than $9 billion. American 
corporation in Mexico have brought in technology even though it 
generally is not highly advanced. Restrictive rules in Mexico limit
24Bilateral Commission on the Future of United StatesMexican Relations, p. 69.
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the percentage of a corporation allowed to be owned by foreigners 
to prevent them from achieving 100% ownership. Recently West 
Germany and Japan have begun to rival the United States in foreign 
investment to Mexico. Overall foreign investment in Mexico 
contributes to less than 15% of Mexico’s GNP though it still has a 
substantial effect on the Mexican economy.
The final indicator of Mexico's dependence on the United States 
is m the area of external debt. This is the most important reason 
for the inflow of foreign capital into the country. In the 1800’s 
Mexico was forced to suspend many of its payments to Great 
Britain, France and Spain. As a consequence Mexico suffered asset 
seizures and faced unwilling creditors. From the early 1900’s 
through the 1940's Mexico found itself unable to raise needed funds 
due to previous defaults. In the aftermath of the war, however, 
Mexico regained access to financial institutions su:h as the World 
Bank and the Export-Import Bank. As a result, the foreign debt 
continued to grow and the United States became Mexico's largest 
creditor, financing approximately 70% of Mexico's debt. Loans from 
private banks are usually less likely to be conditional than those 
loans borrowed from public institutions. Unfortunately for Mexico, 
the United States is currently in the process of restricting the 
amount of credit that private American banks can supply. The 
current national debt, standing at more than $100 billion, accounts 
for more than half of the GNP. Approximately one third of Mexico's 
outstanding debt to commercial banks is owed to U.S. institutions. 
Six of the largest commercial lenders are American banks which 
include Citicorp, Bank of America, Manufacturers Hanover, Chase 
Manhattan, the Chemical Bank, and Morgan Guaranty.25
Lastly, border transactions contribute to the interdependent 
relationship between the two countries. The maquiladora, or 
border assembly industry, began to contribute to the growth of
25Riordan Roett, pp. 43-57.
the national economy in the 1960's. By 1985 it was generating a 
total of $1.3 billion. In this type of border industry both 
countries derive some benefit from such agreements. With an 
increase in population growth and economic activity in these 
areas, the maquiladora is receiving more attention. Conflicts 
result due to disagreements over the rights to the common 
border resources. Growing contamination, pollution and an 
increase in emigration to these areas add to regional poverty. 
There is a mixing of two cultures and a development of twin 
cities on either side of the border that depend on each other for 
continued growth. Ultimately the border not only provides for 
interaction with Mexico but with Latin America as a whole.
VI. Democratization in Latin America
After examining the historical economic development of 
Mexiro, it is pertinent to discuss the possibilities for the 
emergence of democratic practices in the context of such 
conditions. Contrary to previous belief which anticipated the 
evolution of democracy following the process of modernization. It 
has been argued that quite the opposite occurs. In reality 
authoritarian regimes tend to survive modern industrialization, 
especially in Latin American . Previously, this authoritarianism 
evolved in the setting of an agrarian society in the form of a 
caudillo-military structure which maintained a feudal system.
The military would intervene to support the ruling dictator and 
help to enforce his less than popular policies, in present day Latin 
America, the military has evolved into a solid political institution 
harboring now professionalized armed forces. This new military 
intervenes in a modern arena where it has established and 
increased its prominent political role in the Latin American 
society.
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Samuel Huntington explicitly denied the assertion that the 
development of a modern state necessarily leasts to a stable 
democracy. Instead, Huntington argues that such modernization, 
which is accompanied by major social upheavals, undermines the 
stability of existing governments because the regimes are unable 
to successfully control these changes. In addition, new 
institutions are not created fast enough to accommodate such 
change. As massive social mobilization occurs, the inability of 
current institutions to sufficiently channel the demands of 
society often results in a violent seizure of power by a group, 
frequently the military, which considers itself powerful enough to 
restore order and stability.
The situation in Mexico prior to the revolution of 1910 
illustrates this particular phenomenon. Twenty years prior to the 
revolution, Mexico enjoyed extensive economic development. There 
was an increase in the level of mineral and sugar production, in the 
construction of steel mills and railroads, and in foreign trade 
This economic modernization, however, resulted in growing 
nequality between the rich and poor. Control over the new 
industrial wealth was concentrated in the hands of the firmly 
entrenched oligarchy and foreign investors. One percent of the 
population owned 85% of the arable land and the wages of the 
average worker dropped.26 The existing political system was 
unable to provide for political expression for the general Mexican 
population. All power was centralized under Diaz, the ruling 
dictator. The Mexican Revolution was necessary in order to 
restructure the existing system. It pinned the forces of the 
traditional oligarchy against the newly mobilized workers and 
peasants.
It is argued, however, that the political transition in Mexico, 
represented by the revolution was accomplished prior to the true
26Samuel A. Huntington, No Easy Choice (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1976), pp. 64-78.
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formation of interest groups. The political structure before the 
revolution was built upon a hierarchical order where the 
predominant relationship was between a small governing elite 
ruling over the majority of Mexicans. Non-elites had not been 
satisfactorily represented under such a structure. After the 
revolution, however, instead of eventually having the power to 
form their own interest groups, with the evolution of a new 
political order, formal organization of mass interests was 
controlled by the state itself. In such a situation, the masses 
could not expect to be fairly represented, even with the formation 
of a new state. The state, while claiming to represent the 
majority of Mexicans, had as its primary concern the limitation of 
mass representation, blatantly contradicting the masses' fight 
for expanded participation in Mexican politics. The state 
discouraged strong non-elite participation and intended to prevent 
the formation of opposition forces.
After the revolution, although power was centralized once 
again, the system did allow for a degree of mass participation 
within the confines of the national party in power. With the 
emergence of this institutionalism there was a gradual breaking 
down of class structures.27 The revolution itself provided a basis 
for legitimacy for the new system, and by providing for increased 
popular participation the need for military intervention and 
violence lessened. Cdrdenas was especially successful in 
initiating social reforms and assimilating interest groups into the 
system.
Despite advances made by Cdrdenas and a few others, many of 
those who supported the revolution to overthrow Diaz became 
increasingly disillusioned with the newly organized state. The 
average income of the worker decreased as attention turned 
towards providing optimum conditions for foreign investment and
27Kenneth Johnson, pp.52-60.
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import-substitution. The political system was increasingly 
developing along the lines of an authoritarian regime.
Authoritarianism can accurately be described as a system that 
allows for only limited political pluralism, curbing any effective 
opposition parties so as to el.mir.ate competition. There is low 
mobilization of the masses. The more ignorant these masses are 
kept, the less likely it is that they will rebel against the 
government and its policies. This follows the assertion that those 
who are the most poverty-stricken and desolate will not be the 
ones to revolt in the end. The PRI, though allowing for a certain 
degree of strictly controlled opposition, would quickly coopt such 
opposition at the slightest threat to its position of authority.
The origins of Mexican authoritarianism date back to the days of 
the Aztecs who implemented a system of pagan authoritarianism 
where power was concentrated in the hands of the Emperor. Later a 
Christian authoritarianism would be imposed on Mexico by the Spanish 
under Cortes. Fearing possible Indian insubordination. Spam 
destroyed their existing system and subjected the Indians to rule by 
a small Western elite. By the sixteenth century the creoles and 
mestizos were voicing their demands for a share in the power that the 
Spaniards had so effectively preserved for themselves. Soon after 
Mexico gained her independence, the authoritarian tradition continued 
in the form of a dictatorship under General Porfirio Diaz who would 
rule Mexico for the next thirty years. This basic authoritarian 
structure would persevere and enable a small elite to continue the 
practice of forcing the masses intc obedience-a practice that had 
seeped out of the political arena and into other sectors of society as 
well affecting all of Mexican society. The authoritarianism that 
would fohow would involve the concentration of power under the 
control of the politicos, career politicians having worked their way up 
the political hierarchy eventually securing a presidential nomination. 
Before the 1960s an infiltration of tecnicos, college educated men
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with scientific and technical backgrounds, into the upper echelons of 
the political system would be apparent.
According to the theory of Guillermo O'Donnell, bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism, evolving in Mexico during the 1960's, emerged 
as a system of exclusion of the popular sector in response to 
political and economic crisis. Increasingly prominent technocrats 
supported military coups throughout Latin America at this time, 
with the exception of Mexico. Rather than reincorporating the 
popular sectors later, they were excluded from the political 
system and deactivated. A reorientation of the political economy 
took place. The new Latin American regimes began to depend on 
and rely upon international capital. Further industrialization 
could come only with the introduction of transnational capital. In
order to demonstrate that a country was favorable to foreign 
investment, governments needed to facilitate the appearance of an 
economic stability, thus asserting their authority and 
demonstrating an overall stable nation. The upper bourgeoisie, the 
technocrats, the suppliers of capital, and the military joined 
together out of fear of the threat of lower-class mobilization 
which could upset the existing balance of power in which the 
elites wer most benefited.
The principal social base of bureaucratic authoritarianism was 
the upper bourgeoisie dominating by way of trie class structure.
The goals of B-A primarily included the restoration of 'order' in 
society by politically ieactivating the popular sector and 
normalization of the economy.-8 To exclude the popular sector, 
democratic institutions and channels, along with political parties, 
were curbed. The general population was economically excluded as 
well, with growing capital accumulation benefiting the 
oligopolistic sectors. 28
28Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, 
Transitions trom Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Maryland: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 75-90.
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As a result of this distribution of resources, a greater 
inequality between social classes could be recognized. Importing 
most capital from abroad further denationalized the country, 
separating classes further. It is inevitable that a B-A will lose a 
certain amount of legitimacy as institutions coerce and exclude 
the masses limiting participation to mere observance and causing 
fear in society.
Despite the potential for political upheaval due to societal 
inequalities that result from the implementation of an 
authoritarian regime, Mexico is an example of a country that 
successfully maintained a bureaucratic authoritarian regime in 
the late 1950's and early 1960’s. The governing elite began to 
change its form. Replacing old-style politicians united by the 
common experience of the revolution, a young, well-educatea 
technocratic generation began to emerge. These post­
revolutionary elites generally came from wealthy families and 
held high administrative offices as opposed to past elites usually 
coming from lower class families in a line of career 
politicians.20 The classic Mexican political system had consisted 
of a high commanding level-the president, a second level of 
interest groups, and a third level of government bureaucracy. 
Slowly the government bureaucracy began to replace the interest 
groups as the second level of command.
The bureaucracy began to assume a more important role in 
political life. Mexico effectively controlled the popular sector 
through the process of cooptation, to an even greater extent than 
other countries could due to the legitimizing force of the 
revolution. During this era many developing countries were 
concerned with attracting transnational capital for further 
industrialization. In the long-run however, as a result of its 
uniquely successful implementation of B-A, Mexico has 29
29David F. Ronfeldt, The Modern Mexican Military (California: Rand 
Corporation, 1985), pp. 12-14.
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continuously experienced problems with unequal income 
distribution, dependence on the outside world for capital. Balance 
of Payments problems, and a certain degree of repression, though 
not as much oppression as experienced by the region as a whole.
The Balance of Payments problem results from the continued need 
to import heavy capita1 a^ods for industrialization and the need to 
increase imports of food. Agricultural oroduction for export has 
increased while basic food production for export has increased 
while basic food production has decreased. Bureaucratic- 
Authoritarianism has perpetuated Mexico's problems while at the 
same time maintaining a social stability rooted in the origins of 
the revolution.
Guillermo O'Donnell has attributed the problem of continuing 
dictatorships in Latin America to economic factors. According to 
O’Donnell, in the 1960's, with the exhaustion of import- 
substitution, continued economic growth had to rely on depressing 
wages. The masses would not tolerate such a decline, and 
therefore only a military regime was likely to succeed in 
controlling such a situation. A democratic regime would have 
difficulties in maintaining order and its position of authority in an 
atmosphere of growing frustration and discontent among the 
people. The military used this as an excuse to intervene.
O'Donnell argues that before a period of bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism in Latin America, there is often a political and 
economic crisis. Inflation rises, the GNP falls, and the country 
frequently experiences a Balance of Payments problem with the 
increase of imports. The severity of the ensuing authoritarian 
regime depends on the extent to which the popular sector is 
politically mobilized. The greater the level of threat perceived 
by the oligarchy to its economic interests, the greater the 
polarization and potential for class conflict.30 A subsequent 
bonding of dominant forces, namely those of the oligarchy, which
30Guillermo O'Donnell, pp. 34-42.
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uses the military as an extension of its power, and the foreign 
investors, results in the subordination of the middle classes and 
a defeat of the popular sector. With increased fear of threat, 
dominant sectors become more willing to use force to protect 
their interests.
O’Donnell reflects upon the fact that Mexico, a'ong with other 
B-A states, for example, had not been entirely underdeveloped 
prior to the evolution of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the 
1960‘s. Mexico had expanded its industrial sector, though not in a 
vertical manner, had developed modern sociai structures, and had 
even experienced the formation of a working class.
With the development of capitalism, Mexico, and other Latin 
American countries sought international capital and technology.
As Balance of Payments problems continued, however, countries 
were unable to attract the desired capital and investors. Investors 
were unwilling to risk involvement in a country exhibiting an 
unstable economy. Consequently, these countries were unable to 
expand their industrialization. By the end of the 1960's import- 
substitution had been exhausted. Latin American countries became 
extremely dependent on imported capital goods, there was only a 
limited demand for the manufactured goods that these countries 
were producing, and the capital-intensive nature of industry 
meant that few new jobs were provided. Various countries 
devaluated their currencies which resulted in undermining the 
appearance of stability. The success of the economy and national 
development was linked to the control of social unrest
Other explanations rely on cultural factors as a way of 
explaining the reoccurrence of authoritarian regimes throughout 
the 1970's. This is based on the claim that the Iberian culture 
resists liberal values, namely democratic practices.31 Others have 
argued that no effective symbiosis of the Spanish and Aztec
■"John A. Peeler, Latin American Democracies (North Carolina: Umversity 
Press, 1985), pp. 23-33.
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cultures took place. The modern day PRI represents that imperfect 
symbiosis. Consequently, Mexicans are traditionally distrustful of 
the state and psychologically unable to protect themselves against 
increasing corruption and repression. They to'erate the repression 
and then eventually rebel violently against it.
Overall, until recently, Mexico has enjoyed political stability 
unique to that part of the world, due in pari to the revolutionary 
origins referred to by O'Donnell. Born of revolution, the c ilian 
regime partially incorporates broad sectors of society which had 
come together in opposition of an oppressive government. The 
Mexican bureaucratic hierarchy has enjoyed a higher rate of 
success than many others in the area. In the past it has been much 
less prone to massive dislocations from economic stress. Because 
of its basic incorporation of various sectors the government in 
general has traditionally been more open to pressures from the 
bottom, from the non-elites. The massive cooptation makes the 
need for force much less as noted again by O’Donnell.
Generally, throughout Latin America, a coup will immediately 
follow a period of crisis. In Mexico, however, conflicts and 
tensions have been effectively internalized within the PRI. A 
strong tradition of non-intervention has always guided the 
Mexican military. For the most part, the military has respected 
the legitimacy of the political system. The basis of the 
government's legitimacy rests solely on its constitutional 
authority with the habit of obedience already instilled in the 
military. By the 1940's the revolutionary military had begun to 
move away from policymaking and became a more marginal rotor.
It was not until the late 1960's that it reemerged as a viable 
force after it violently put down the student-led rebellion. The 
military had become more professionalized until this point which 
perhaps further prevented it from interfering in politics.
Presently the Mexican military has modernized itsel*. Officers 
are better educated and military technology has improved. It is
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emerging as a modern and respected power in society. Whereas 
the President and the PRI had previously represented the sole 
political pillar in Mexican politics, presently the military and 
representatives from various economic groups are included in this 
new structure. Trying to gain such respect, the military is 
unlikely to stage a coup or overstate its political boundaries of 
p o we r s  The Mexican military, unlike other Latin American 
militaries, considers the civil government to be more capable of 
effectively running the government which checks its ultimate 
involvement as well. Though the military respects th6 legitimacy 
of the government, recently the legitimacy of the government is 
being severely challenged in other sectors. As widespread 
corruption continues, the people are less willing to passively 
accept government actions. The disillusionment continued after 
the 1988 elections when the PRI won yet again, amidst claims of 
election fraud.
Another factor which added to the initial success of the 
revolution and to continued stability is external support. At the 
time of the revolution, Mexicans were fighting a ruthless, bloody 
battle, and national sentiment was most definitely anti- 
American. However, the United States never forcefully opposed 
the uprising, anti-Yankee sentiment has diminished with time.
Despite a tendency towards authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America, certain attempts at democracy are visible as veil. At 
the time of Latin American independence, many countries adopted 
democratic constitutions of such a nature as to be acceptable to 
even the United States and Western Europe. With the removal of 
the Spanish Monarchy, which supposedly ruled by 'the Grace of 
God', the most appealing replacement was government by the 32
32Ronfeldt, pp. 18-23.
33Marlln C. Needier, The Problem of Democracy in Latin America 
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 42-56.
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consent of the governed.44 In addition, nothing else appeared to be 
a better solution. Although, the norms of democracy were 
established, however, a rather large discrepancy would exist 
between democratic, theory and actual practice. From the 
beginning, behind the democratic front, a privileged elite ruled 
over the masses.
As time passes, it is ever more difficult to effectively hide an 
authoritarian regime behind a democratic facade. Previous 
circumstances allowing for that type of structure are diminishing. 
Increased political participation strengthens the established 
political institutions causing the government to respond to mass 
demands. As more people are mobilized, they realize that a 
government that pretends to be democratic while serving only 
elitist interests cannot be tolerated. The armed forces tend to 
intervene to prevent social change and to maintain established 
order, but are now increasingly allowing their respective countries 
to once again uphold the original democratic constitutions.
It is useful here to provide a definition of democracy and apply 
it to three distinct countries in the region which are deserving of 
the title. One definition includes the emphasis on universal 
suffrage, free and competitive elections, the freedom of 
organization and political action and that tnese elements are 
maintained for a period of at least fifteen y e a r s . J o h n s o n  adds 
the existence of popular sovereignty under impartial laws applied 
equally to all and a clear distinction between the private and 
public sectors, thus preven no the state from enriching itself at 
public expense. Colombia. Costa Rica, and Venezuela began the 
twentieth century economically with at least minimal export 
capacity. Until Venezuela began exploiting its petroleum reserves 
after World War I, coffee was the major export of all three nations. 345
34David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 21-34.
35Peeler, pp. 44-57.
These countries were not poverty-stricken and participated in a 
limited way in the world economy. Though not the most prosperous 
of Latin American countries, they maintained themselves. Each 
showed great inequalities in land tenure and problems of income 
distribution, though none had extraordinarily serious problems in 
comparison with the rest of the region. Common to all three was 
the control and manipulation of the constitution and of elections. 
For the most part, these characteristics are common to most of the 
Latin American countries.
The significant difference between these countries and other 
Latin American countries can be seen in more recent developments. 
There is a certain amount of civility between rival elites. Civil 
liberties are more widely accepted and there is less obvious 
control of the election processes. Opposition groups are allowed to 
develop and there is an expansion of mass education and suffrage.
In Colombia, traditional parties have been upgraded. In Costa Rica 
the Communist Party and the National Liberation Party have taken 
root. In Venezuela changes in parties have resulted in greater 
liberality. As these changes were implemented, mass movements, 
including some degree of violence, facilitated the transition from a 
hegemonic system, and limited opposition, to a liberal 
democracy.3* The hegemonic regimes accepted the idea of 
liberalization but did not voluntarily agree to the evolution of a 
liberal democracy. In all three cases, the armed forces were 
unavailable as opponents. In Costa Rica, the military had been 
defeated and abolished while in Colombia and Venezuela the 
military willingly liquidated military dictatorships in order to 
return to civilian regimes.
Throughout the democratization process in Latin America, a 
single factor appears to be most important in the analysis by 
Needier. This factor is accommodation. All rival elites are 
recognized and each group receives the same privileges and rights
4 6
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as any of the others. This does not, however, include the rights of 
the interest groups v/hich are most often excluded from political 
participation. Needier identifies three principal components of 
democracy which must be present in the political system for 
accommodation to develop. The first is a relatively equal 
distribution of wealth. This gives opposition groups the resources 
necessary to be competitive in a pluralist society. Democracy will 
be resisted by those minorities in whose hands the national wealth 
is concentrated. Conversely, where the masses wield the power, 
public policy will be directed towards the equalization of property 
and income. This, of course, would result in economic loss for the 
traditional minorities.
The second necessary component, according to Needier, is a 
favorable international environment. Extensive external economic 
dependence, mostly for capital imports, typically brings economic 
and political instability, increased military action, and 
repression. Tht imported capital gon<ir>, as mentioned before, 
usually benefit the elites and create an unfavorable Balance of 
Payments. The population becomes disillusioned and the state 
must resort to repression to preserve the 'order'. External 
hegemonic powers on which the Latin American countries are 
often dependent, generally show an interest in maintaining the 
status quo' which necessarily implies the use of force to make 
discontented masses obey the government.
Third, Needier states that a certain level of legitimacy must 
exist within the system. The principles upon which a democracy is 
based should be in accordance with the population's ideas of 
legitimacy. In addition, the new system should produce 
satisfactory economic results. An increase in economic growth 
leads to social mobilization. It also allows for the demands of the 
population to be met out of an increase in wealth and not merely 
through existing resources, and the people in general will perceive 
the system as successful.
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In the presence of these conditions, rivals negotiate amongst 
themselves in a more civil manner. When the dominating elites 
realized that democracy would not be ultimately infringing upon 
their previous rights, the system became more widely accepted.17 
The contractual nature of accommodation, which promotes 
discussion and negotiation between rivals, is that which 
distinguished these countries from others. With such a strategy 
it becomes important to introduce limited social reforms which 
pacify the masses while not allowing for too much mobilization 
so as to lead to possible competition with the government.
Baloyra defines democratization as the real recognition of civil 
and political rights with the emergence of political parties, party 
systems and interest groups. He lists four conditions which should 
be present for the implementation of democracy. The first is 
national unity which facilitates the pursuit of a common national 
goal. The presence of this condition is not necessarily sufficient 
in itself. The second condition is social equality with an equal 
distribution of resources. Like Needier, Baloyra also mentions the 
condition of elite agreement where there is a compromise among 
decision-makers to avoid violence and separation. Fourth, he talks 
about democratic viability which signifies that everyone does not 
necessarily consider democracy to be the best solution perhaps, 
only a pragmatic and preferable solution. Gentleman and Smith 
include the condition of free and competitive elections, as do 
several others. They also mention the necessity for spaces that 
channel mass interests where everyone is fairly represented in the 
implementation of democracy.
In the midst of such discussion, Mexico has been classified 
under varying degrees of democratization. Some say that Mexico is
37Peeler, pp. 61-68.
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decidedly an authoritarian regime.™ Others argue that it is 
definitely on the way to becoming a democratic regime.''9 In terms 
of accommodation, the PRI attempts to limit all opposition that 
might in fact become legitimate competition. As the people begin 
to question the real legitimacy of the PRI, it may be forced to 
adopt more democratic practices if it aspires to retain a position 
of authority in a society filled with a growing sense of 
disillusionment.
It is fairly evident that the general conditions considered 
necessary for the successful implementation of democracy are not 
altogether present in Mexican society. Certainly, an unequal 
distribution of wealth is still present. It seems unlikely that 
democracy would emerge where all societal groups do not have 
equal access to the resources necessary tc be competitive with 
other groups. There is. however, a certain accommodation present 
throughout Mexican society as the PRI successfully coopts all 
threatening dissenters in the party. This lessens the need for 
violent competition among the elites. By offering elites money or 
prestigious jobs, they are brought into the party by rational means. 
The presence of opposition forces in Mexico holds a particular 
interest in present day politics. Opposition parties have made 
more progress recently than ever before and have gained a certain 
legitimacy. The elections of 1988 opened up the election process 
as never before. However, in the final moment, when the PRI 
thought it might actually lose, the elections once again took on 
their traditional form. Vote counts were delayed and corruption 
surmised. Although the parties have gained some recognition, 
elections cannot be considered truly free and competitive. A 
certain degree of democratization may be present in Mexico today, 
though it is uncertain whether Mexico will eventually become a
38Judith Gentleman. Mexican Politics in Transition (Colorado: Westview Press. 
1987), pp. 25-30.
39Martin C Needier, pp. 29-37.
'real' democracy. It is more likely for the moment that it will just 
adopt certain democratic tendencies. It is fairly unlikely, as well, 
that Mexico could resort back to the old ways of authoritarianism, 
exactly as it was before, now that opposition parties have had 
some success. For this to occur, the government would be forced 
to rely on the use of repression to restrain the masses, thus 
damaging its already questionable legitimacy.
VII. The Presidential Elections of 1988
The presidential elections of July 1988 in Mexico reflected the 
democratic tendencies which are evolving in Mexican society. The 
elections may well have permanently altered the course of Mexican 
politics. For the first time since the formation of the national 
party in 1929. the PRI no longer holds a secure monopoly over 
national power. Having endured many years of economic hardship, 
people are becoming disillusioned with the present system and are 
seeking an alternative This growing disillusionment is a 
reflection on the PRI's overly complacent manner which is a result 
of decades of unchallenged rule. Firmly entrenched in the system, 
the party has not felt great pressure to satisfy the every demand 
of the masses until recently. The government's apparent inability 
to adequately solve Mexico's economic problems has caused the 
masses to question the legitimacy of the PRI to continue its rule.
Despite increasing discontent of the masses, a PRI victory was 
nonetheless anticipated by many. Differing from past elections 
however, the elections of 1988 appeared to be more openly 
competitive, with opposition parties having a more than 
substantial effect on proceedings. Previously the PRI had won each 
election with at least 70% of the vote. This time, however, the PRI 
candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari won with 50.36% of the 19 
million votes counted. This figure is 20 points less than any
50
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majority a PRI candidate has ever received in 59 years.
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the leftist opponent, and formerly a member 
of the PRI. who was representing the National Democratic Front, 
captured 31.12% of the votes, and Manuel Clothier, the PAN 
candidate, received only 17.07%. Two other minor candidates 
account for the rest of the total.4"
Ultimately the PRI received 260 of the 500 seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies. The PRI has lost its two thirds majority in Congress, 
resulting in the inability of the government to make constitutional 
amendments at will. In addition. Cdrdenas and his party acquired 4 
of the 64 seats in what previously was a Senate consisting solely 
of members of the PR'.
In spite of assertions that the elections of 1988 were much less 
hampered by fraud in comparison to previous elections, by Mexican 
standards ai least, many claimed that the election had been stolen 
by the PRI. The accusations were most strongly heard from the 
opposition parties themselves. In December 1986, the government 
under de la Madrid was responsible for amending the constitution 
and for determining new electoral guidelines. In addition, the 
government changed the make-up of the Federal Electoral 
Commission (CFE), giving itself a clear majority instead of 
maintaining the tradition of even representation from all parties. 
This enabled the PRI to shape the election process to its advantage. 
To illustrate this point, the PRI vetoed a motion to extend 
registration, which would have allowed thousands of Cardenas 
supporters to cast their votes. The PRI is accused of fraudulent 
registration as well. By gaining the majority in the CFE, the PRI 
can control all voter registration. Through random surveys, it was 
discovered that at least 20 percent of registered voters were 
either dead, underage, or not residing at the address listed. 40
40Carla Ann Robbins, "A Sea of Change in Mexico," U.S News and World Report. 
25 July 1988, p. 30.
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During the election, the reputation of the PRI was further 
tarnished with the murder of a Cardenas aide, f rancisco Javier 
Ovando Hernandez and his secretary, Roman Gil Heraldez in the 
capital four days before the election,while they were trying to 
implement their own system for vote counting separate from that 
of the PRI. Cardenas denounced the killings as political 
assassinations. Though Cardenas never openly accused the PRI, 
who dismissed the incident as a plot executed by criminals 
prosecuted by Ovando during his time as an attorney, many 
Mexicans became even more distrustful of the national party.
Alsu during the elections, in various rural areas, the PRI captured 
over 99% of the vote when intimidation by paramilitary 
organizations prevented opposition supporters from casting their 
vote.41
One of the most highly disputed events of election day was the 
malfunction of the computerized vote tabulation system five hours 
after the polls had closed. After the elections, fraud apparently 
persisted. The PRI, promising results from vote tabulation for as 
early as two hours after voting, delayed results until a week after 
election day. Amidst claims of foul and fraud, opposition 
candidates from the left and the right joined forces for the first 
time, to denounce the questionable behavior of the PRI. On election 
night Clouthier, Cardenas, and Rosario Ibarra, of the Marxist 
Mexican Workers Party, went together to the EFC to protest the 
alleged fraud. In the end, Interior Minister Manuel Bartlett, head of 
the commission, dismissed the accusations as lacking ir, proof. At 
this point the PRI was readying itself to negotiate with the 
opposition if need be, to avoid any possible political crisis.
With each questionable occurrence, especially with the delay in 
election results, The promises of Salinas for a clean election 
became less meaningful. Ultimately, Salinas's insistence on a 
cleaner election caused the PRI to lose seats in the legislature. As
41Cornelius, pp. 23-34.
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the vote counting lingered on, there was speculation as to whether 
a still influential Old Guard, angry about its losses, were the ones 
who finally took charge of fixing election results, disobeying 
orders from Salinas. Some people are wary of one who cannot very 
effectively control his own party, being able to control the entire 
nation and implementing the necessary economic and political 
policies to increase prosperity in Mexico
The greatest competition faced by Salinas in the 1988 
elections was from Cardenas. Cardenas was born in 1934 the 
year in which his legendary father became president. In 1980 he 
was elected governor of Michoacan with the support of the PRI. 
Cardenas began to question the commitment of the party to the 
poor and helped to found the Democratic Current to give PRI rank- 
and-file members mere power in choosing a presidential 
candidate. When the PRI banished him and his followers from the 
party, Cardenas announced his candidacy for president in the 
upcoming elections. His stated justification for his challenge to 
the PRI is his desire to give all Mexicans the opportunities he had 
grown up with. His concerns included lessening national 
corruption, more evenly distributing the wealth, and preserving a 
certain independence from the businessman and from the United 
States.
The Cdrdenas platform, consisting of an economic new deal, 
which includes improved social services, a rejection of U.S. 
intervention in Latin American affairs and support for a Central 
American peace initiative, seemed actually fairly similar *o that 
which the PRI has been advocating since its earlier days. The 
difference lies in the fact that the people no longer trust the PRI 
to effectively control the government amidst corruption and 
worsening living standards. In addition to his basic proposals, 
Cdrdenas also advocated the redirection ' f payments of Mexico's 
billion dollar debt, which Salinas finances by cutting subsidies on 
food and transportation, in order to be able to better economic
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conditions for the people and establish a democratic multi-party 
system. As a populist. Cardenas is critical of a decrease in 
public spending which Salinas advocated when he was budget 
minister because a continuous decrease in living standards and 
growing unemployment will only create unrest amongst the 
masses.
Similar to the approach of his father. C&rdenas is mobilizing 
the masses against the institutional forces of the national party- 
-only the name of the institutional forces has changed, from the 
National Revolutionary Party to its modern day embodiment in the 
PRI. While Lazaro Cardenas was initiating a movement from the 
top, however, his son was assembling a broad coalition of 
interest groups which had already formed at the grassroots in 
opposition to worsening conditions, primarily economic, in Mexico. 
C&rdenas, in this respect, has decidedly emerged as a growing 
force in Mexican politics with his support from young leftists and 
the rural and urban poor.
Less significant perhaps, but noteworthy nonetheless, was the 
success of the PAN candidate Clouthier, 54. Building on the 
premise that a limited government role in the system is more 
desirable, Clouthier presented his right of center party as yet 
another option available to the people. Associated with the middle 
class and more conservative elements of the Roman Catholic 
Church .however, Clouthier could not generate the support that 
Cdrdenas did among the workers and the peasants disillusioned 
with the PRI.
President Salinas will find it necessary to pacify the 
discontented masses if he is to effectively run the country. 
Currently the debate has centered around whether or not Cardenas 
and the opposition will continue in their endeavors so as to 
eventually undermine any stability that the political system 
presently claims. When the election had ended and the results had 
been announced, the PRI leaders predicted that, within a short
period of time, the majority of the Cardenas support would 
diminish. Despite this prediction, it was suggested that the PRI, 
in order to quell the potential for political unrest, offer 
concessions to Cardenas in the form of greater access to the 
government-controlled media and genuine opportunities to win a 
few governorships.
Salinas has also been forced to pacify the Old Guard of the PRI 
which is concerned with the preservation of the absolute unity 
and dominance of the national party. With Salinas's 
determination to pursue democratic practices, the Old Guard 
cannot aspire to return to machine rule. For the first time, the 
PRI won by a slight margin only instead of the traditional 80%.42 
It's possible that some hard-liners may abandon the party in the 
end.
While Cardenas did promote a return to big-government 
policies, which are perhaps a bit out of date, Salinas instead 
identifies himself with the 'new generation'. He is concerned with 
'modernizing' Mexico both politically and economically. His 
progress will most likely depend on the traditional support of 
rural Mexico, on those who are poor and uneducated. To this end, 
Salinas may well need to negotiate easier terms for the 
repayment of the Mexican debt and to challenge the U.S. stance on 
drug trafficking, immigration and Central America. Salinas, 
however, strongly identifies with U.S. views and policy, more than 
his predecessors. Thus any superficial opposition to the United 
States will most likely be intended solely to pacify the masses 
temporarily .
Salinas asserts that Mexico is decidedly no longer a one-party 
system. The arena presently consists of a majority party 
encountering substantially competitive opposition. According to 
Salinas, the emergence of these opposition parties signals a shift 
towards democracy. True political liberalization, as Salinas is
42Cornelius, pp. 67-76.
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aware, is necessary in the stabilization of a debt burdened 
economy with unstable growth patterns. As seen elsewhere in the 
world, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is a 
complicated one not without its tensions and strains. Meanwhile, 
Cdrdenas and future opposition will continue their protests.
Certain patterns of change have been apparent in the last few 
decades in the Mexican political system. There has been a shift 
from politicos to tecnicos. Salinas is the fourth most recent 
president to have a technical background without having worked his 
way of the political ladder to achieve the presidency like was the 
usual pattern in the past. These new leaders are versed instead in 
the policies of economics.
The context of the 1988 elections was generally the most 
distinct element distinguishing it from previous elections. A 
continuous economic crisis had plagued the de la Madrid 
administration limiting economic growth. Per capita income 
decreased, real wages decreased, and the national debt climbed as 
the Mexican Miracle and import-substitution faded into the past. 
There has also been a reduction in the economic role of the state. 
Small economic adjustments had not been enough so Mexico 
switched to a strategy of complete liberalization which involved a 
greater degree of privatization and commercial liberalization. 
Thirdly, grassroots mobilization had begun to emerge on account of 
greater education and communication within society. Labor unions 
had been weakening and discontent was rising. A popular 
consciousness earnestly began to challenge the legitimacy of the 
government. A real political opposition was emerging.
A call for reform dominated the 1988 election proceedings. One 
cause for this call was the fact that a depletion in domestic and 
external resources restricts the PRI from effectively bribing and 
coopting as before. In order to effect extensive democratic 
reform, therefore, Mexican political structures will have to 
change. For one, the way in which the incumbent president
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ultimately decides who will succeed him would ultimately have to 
be revised so that the masses could at least have an indirect say in 
presidential nominations.
VII. Conclusion
The ultimate future of Mexico anil its one-parly system 
dominated by the PRI is uncertain. The party effectively 
consolidated its political power for more than fifty years through 
the principal use of cooptation, in the midst of a substantially 
unstable region. Now it has increasingly begun to lose its 
legitimacy originating with the goals of the revolution which 
formed the basis of its authority. In the midst of chronic and 
persisting low standards of living for the average Mexican, 
oppositional forces have emerged and gained more recognition as 
of late. The development of grassroots organizations has 
increased public awareness and concern for the direction of 
Mexican politics. With limited official recognition of the 
opposition parties by the PRI. it would be difficult to return to the 
traditional era of the true one-party system. Given access to the 
political system, oppositional groups are likely to press for more 
concessions, and unless given more legitimate chances for success, 
will perhaps rebel against the entrenched political system. 
Answering such rebellion with repression would only discredit the 
PRI further. The PRI, already realizing that it is losing part of its 
exclusive position of authority, will probably resist the 
implementation of a true form of democracy, but may become 
more open to advances made by the opposition. Substantial 
structural reforms in Mexican society would have to occur in 
order to usher in a complete democracy, including a change in the 
distribution of wealth and completely free and competitive 
elections. For now, the PRI will exploit all possible resources to
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m aintain  its current, though altered, form  of authorits w hile  
offering  very lim ited  access to other parties so as to continue the 
trend o f overall stab ility .
President Salinas w ill face strong social, economic and social 
pressures due to the depressed suite o f the econom y and 
increased m ob iliza tion  by the po litical opposition. In addition, 
labor discontent has grown as a result o f the weak state o f  
econom ic affairs as w ell. The PR I w ill undoubtedly continue its 
practice o f cooptation, appealing to a nationalistic M exican pride in 
order to do so. The future strength of the PR I w ill depend on the 
ab ility  o f Salinas and his tecnicos to control the old guard, institute 
at least lim ited  reform s, and become more dem ocratic from  
w ith in .
A less likely scenario would see the ascension to power by 
Cardenas and the FDN. This would only occur after a substantial 
political crisis where the PRI would ultimately lose the legitimacy 
necessary to continue its rule. The emergence of such a situation 
will depend on the length of time that the opposition is able to 
prolong controversy over election fraud. The longer such 
controversy endures, the greater the potential for massive social 
upheaval, though the difficulty of sustaining a debate after an 
election has terminated is great. Furthermore, despite waning 
support for the PRI, the party still maintains a strong position in 
the Congress and the electoral commission. Finally, the Mexican 
masses may not actually be ready to consider the radical idea of 
taking the power away from a party which has ruled 
uninterrupted for so many decades.
B IB L IO G R A P H Y
Books
Baloyra, Enrique A. G nm parinn New Dem ocracies. Colorado: 
W estv iew  Press, 1987.
B ilateral Com m ission on the f uture o f United States-M exican
Relations. The Challenge of Interdependence: M e xico and the 
U nited  States. New  York: U niversity Press o f Am erica.
1989.
C ockcroft. James. Dependence and U nderdeve lo pm ent. Garden 
C ity: D o u b le d a y /A n c h o r, 1972
Collier, David, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Cornelius, Wayne E., Judith Gentleman and Peter H. Smith, ed.
M e x ic o ’s A lternative  Political Futures. C aliforn ia : Center for 
U .S .-M e x ic a n  Studies, 1989.
Dirk. Raat W. Mexico: From Independence to Revolution. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
Gentleman, Judith. Mexican Politics in Transition. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1987.
Heilman, Judith Adler. Mexico in Crisis. New York: Holmes and 
Meier Publishers, 1983.
Huntington. Samuel A. No Easy Choice. Massachusetts: Hatvard 
University Press, 1976.
International Security Council. Crisis and Response: A Roundtable 
on Mexico. New Yoik: Causa Publications, 1986.
Johnson, Kenneth. Mexican Democracy A Critical View. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985.
Ladman, Jerry R., ed. Mexico: A Country in Crisis. Texas: Texas 
Western Press, 1983.
Meyer. Michael C. and William L. Sherman. The Course ol Mexican 
History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Musgrave. Peggy B.. ed. Mexico and the United States. Colorado: 
West view Press. 1985.
Nafey. Abdul. Dominant Party Politics. Massachusetts: Uexington 
Books. 1987.
Needier. Martin C. The Problem of Democracy in Latin A im'lkii. 
Massachusetts: Uexington Books. 1987.
O'Donnell. Guillermo. Philippe C. Schmitter and Uaurence
Whitehead. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects 
for Democracy. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986.
Peeler, John A. Uatin American Democracies. North Carolina: 
University Press. 1985.
Riding, Alan. Distant Neighbors. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1985,
Roett, Riordan, ed. Mexico and the United Sates. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1988.
Ronfeldt, David F. The Modern Mexican Military. California: Rand 
Corporation, 1985.
Silva-Michelena, Jose, ed. Latin America Peace. Democratization 
and Economic Crisis. Tokyo: The United Nations University, 
1988.
Skidmore, Thomas E. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989.
Thompson, John K. Inflation. Financial Markets and Economic 
D evelopm ent. Massachusetts: Lexington Books. 1983.
Velasco-S., Jesus-Augustin. Impacts of Mexican Oil Policy on 
Economic and Political Development. Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1983.
Ward, Peter. Welfare Politics in Mexico. Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1986.
Wiarda, Howard J., ed. The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in 
Latin America. Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.
Encyclopedias
"Mexico." Political Risk Yearbook. 1986 ed.. pp. 190-220. 
"Mexico." The Stateman's Yearbook. 1989 ed.. pp. 120-26. 
"Mexico." Encyclopedia of the Third World. 1987 ed.. pp. 1348- 
5 5 .
Periodicals
McGuire, Stryker. "We are not Pieces of Paper." N ew sw eek. 25 
July 1988. pp. 32-34.
Robbins. Carla Anne. "A Sea of Change in Mexico." L’ .S. News and 
World Report. 25 July 1988, pp. 21-3.
Smolowe, Jill. "Too Close for Comfort." Time. 18 July 1988, pp. 8-
10.
